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Abstract—The society’s insatiable appetites for personal data
are driving the emergency of data markets, allowing data con-
sumers to launch customized queries over the datasets collected
by a data broker from data owners. In this paper, we study
how the data broker can maximize her cumulative revenue by
posting reasonable prices for sequential queries. We thus propose
a contextual dynamic pricing mechanism with the reserve price
constraint, which features the properties of ellipsoid for efficient
online optimization, and can support linear and non-linear
market value models with uncertainty. In particular, under low
uncertainty, our pricing mechanism provides a worst-case regret
logarithmic in the number of queries. We further extend to other
similar application scenarios, including hospitality service, online
advertising, and loan application, and extensively evaluate three
pricing instances of noisy linear query, accommodation rental,
and impression over MovieLens 20M dataset, Airbnb listings in
U.S. major cities, and Avazu mobile ad click dataset, respectively.
The analysis and evaluation results reveal that our proposed
pricing mechanism incurs low practical regret, online latency,
and memory overhead, and also demonstrate that the existence
of reserve price can mitigate the cold-start problem in a posted
price mechanism, and thus can reduce the cumulative regret.
Index Terms—personal data market, revenue maximization,
contextual dynamic pricing, reserve price
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of Internet of Things (IoTs), tremen-
dous volumes of data are collected to monitor human behaviors
in daily life. However, for the sake of security, privacy, or busi-
ness competition, most of data owners are reluctant to share
their data, resulting in a large number of data islands. The
data isolation status locks the value of personal data against
potential data consumers, such as commercial companies,
financial institutions, medical practitioners, and researchers. To
facilitate personal data circulation, more and more data brokers
have emerged to build bridges between the data owners and
the data consumers. Typical data brokers in industry include
Factual [1], DataSift [2], Datacoup [3], CitizenMe [4], and
CoverUS [5]. On one hand, a data broker needs to adequately
compensate the privacy leakages of data owners during the
usage of their data, and thus incentivize them to contribute
private data. On the other hand, the data broker should properly
charge the online data consumers for their sequential queries
over the collected datasets, since the behaviors of both under-
pricing and overpricing can incur the loss of revenue at the data
broker. Such a data circulation ecosystem is conventionally
called “data market” in the literature [6].
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Fig. 1. Single-round regret function of a posted price mechanism with reserve
price constraint, if the reserve price is no more than the market value.
In this paper, we study how to trade personal data for rev-
enue maximization from the data broker’s standpoint in online
data markets. We summarize three major design challenges
as follows. The first and the thorniest challenge is that the
objective function for optimization is quite complicated. The
principal goal of a data broker in data markets is to maximize
her cumulative revenue, which is defined as the difference
between the prices of queries charged from the data consumers
and the privacy compensations allocated to the data owners.
Let’s examine one round of data trading as follows. Given
a query, the privacy leakages together with the total privacy
compensation, regarded as the reserve price of the query, are
virtually fixed. Thus, for revenue maximization, an ideal way
for the data broker is to post a price, which takes the larger
value of the query’s reserve price and market value. However,
the reality is that the data broker does not know the exact
market value, and can only estimate it from the context of
the current query and the historical transaction records. Of
course, loose estimations will lead to different levels of regret:
if the reserve price is higher than the market value, the query
definitely cannot be sold, and the regret is zero; if the reserve
price is no more than the market value, as shown in Fig. 1,
a slight underestimation of the market value incurs a low
regret, whereas a slight overestimation causes the query not
to be sold, generating a high regret. Therefore, the initial
goal of revenue maximization can be equivalently converted to
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regret minimization. Considering even the single-round regret
function is piecewise and highly asymmetric, it is nontrivial for
the data broker to perform optimization for multiple rounds.
Yet, another challenge lies in how to model the market
values of the customized queries from the data consumers. To
minimize the regret in pricing online queries, the pivotal step
for the data broker is to gain a good knowledge of their market
values. However, markets for personal data significantly differ
from conventional markets in that each data consumer as a
buyer, rather than the data broker as a seller, can determine
the product, namely a query. In general, each query involves
a concrete data analysis method and a tolerable level of noise
added to the true answer, which are both customized by a
data consumer [7], [8]. Hence, the queries from different data
consumers are highly differentiated, and are uncontrollable
by the data broker. This striking property further implies that
most of the dynamic pricing mechanisms, which target iden-
tical products or a manageable number of distinct products,
cannot apply here. Besides, existing works on data pricing,
which either considered a single query [9] or investigated the
determinacy relation among multiple queries [8], [10]–[18],
but ignored whether the data consumers accept or reject the
marked prices, and thus omitted modeling the market values
of queries, are parallel to this work.
The ultimate challenge comes from the novel online pricing
with reserve price setting. For the market value estimation
of a query, the data broker can only exploit the current and
historical queries. Thus, the pricing of sequential queries can
be viewed as an online learning process. In addition to the
usual tension between exploitation and exploration, our pricing
problem also needs to incorporate three atypical aspects.
First, the feedback after trading one query is very limited.
In particular, the data broker can only observe whether the
posted price for the query is higher than its market value or
not, but cannot obtain the exact market value, which makes
standard online learning algorithms [19], [20] inapplicable.
Second, the reserve price essentially imposes a lower bound
on the posted price beyond the market value estimation, while
the ordering between the reserve price and the market value
is unknown. Besides, the impact of such a lower bound on
the whole learning process has not been studied. Last but
not least, the online mode requires our design of the posted
price mechanism to be quite efficient. In other words, the data
broker needs to choose each posted price and further update
her knowledge about the market value model with low latency.
Jointly considering the above three challenges, we propose a
contextual dynamic pricing mechanism with the reserve price
constraint for the data broker to maximize her revenue in
online personal data markets. For problem formulation, we
first adopt contextual/hedonic pricing to model the market
values of different queries, which are a certain linear or non-
linear function of their features plus some uncertainty. Besides,
we choose the state of the privacy compensations under a
query as its feature vector. In fact, such a feature representation
inherits the key principle of cost-plus pricing. For posted
price mechanism design, we start with the fundamental linear
model, and covert the market value estimation problem to
dynamically exploiting and exploring the market values of
different features, i.e., the weight vector in the linear model.
Specifically, depending on whether a sale occurs or not in
each round, the data broker can introduce a linear inequality
to update her knowledge set about the weight vector. Thus,
the raw knowledge set is kept in the shape of polytope,
which makes the real-time task of predicting the range of a
query’s market value computationally infeasible. To handle
this problem, we replaces the raw knowledge set with its
smallest enclosing ellipsoid, namely Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid.
Under the ellipsoid-shaped knowledge set, it only requires a
few matrix-vector and vector-vector multiplications to obtain
a lower bound and an upper bound on each query’s market
value. By further incorporating the total privacy compensation,
namely the reserve price, as an additional lower bound, we
define a conservative posted price and an exploratory posted
price for a query. In particular, using the conservative price,
the data broker sells the query with the highest probability, but
cannot refine the knowledge set, and thus may not benefit the
subsequent rounds. In contrast, the exploratory price, which
is inspired by bisection, suffers a higher risk of no sale, but
can narrow down the knowledge set by most, and thus may
benefit the subsequent rounds most. In a nutshell, these two
kinds of posted prices give different biases to the immediate
rewards (exploitation) and the future rewards (exploration).
Besides, the choice of which price in a certain round hinges
on the size measure of the latest knowledge set. We further
investigate how to tolerate uncertainty, and mainly introduce a
“buffer” in posting the price and updating the knowledge set.
We finally extend to several non-linear models commonly used
in interpreting market values, including log-linear, log-log,
logistic, and kernelized models. For other similar application
scenarios, we outline the characteristics of online personal
data markets, including customization, existence of reserve
price, and timeliness, and further illustrate the extensions to
hospitality service on booking platforms, online advertising
on web publishers, and loan application from banks and other
financial institutions.
We list our key contributions in this paper as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study
trading personal data for revenue maximization, from the data
broker’s point of view in online data markets. Additionally,
we formulate this problem into a contextual dynamic pricing
problem with the reserve price constraint.
• Our proposed pricing mechanism features the properties of
ellipsoid to exploit and explore the market values of sequential
queries effectively and efficiently. It facilitates both linear
and non-linear market value models, and is robust to some
uncertainty. In particular, the worst-case regret under low
uncertainty is O(max(n2 log(T/n), n3 log(T/n)/T )), where
n is the dimension of feature vector and T is the total number
of rounds. Besides, the time and space complexities are O(n2).
Furthermore, our market framework can also support trading
other similar products, which share common characteristics
with online queries.
Data Analysis
Noise Perturbation
1
2
T
3
Privacy 
Compensation
Personal Data
Posted Price
Query
Answer
Payment
Data Consumers Data Broker Data Owners
Fig. 2. A general system model of online personal data markets. (The smile indicates that the posted price is accepted and a deal is made.)
• We extensively evaluate three application instances over
three real-world datasets. The analysis and evaluation results
reveal that our pricing mechanism incurs low practical regret,
online latency, and memory overhead, under both linear and
non-linear market value models and over both sparse and dense
feature vectors. In particular, (1) for the pricing of noisy linear
query under the linear model, when n = 100 and the number
of rounds t is 105, the regret ratio of our pricing mechanism
with reserve price (resp., with reserve price and uncertainty) is
7.77% (resp., 9.87%), reducing 57.19% (resp., 45.64%) of the
regret ratio than a risk-averse baseline, where the reserve price
is posted in each round; (2) for the pricing of accommodation
rental under the log-linear model, when n = 55, t = 74, 111,
and the ratio between the natural logarithms of market value
and reserve price is set to 0.6, the regret ratio of our pricing
mechanism is 3.83%, reducing 77.46% of the regret ratio
compared with the risk-averse baseline; (3) for the pricing
of impression under the logistic model, when n = 1024 and
t = 105, the regret ratios of our pure pricing mechanism are
8.04% and 0.89% in the spare and dense cases, respectively.
Furthermore, the online latencies of three applications per
round are in the magnitude of millisecond, and the memory
overheads are less than 160MB.
• We instructively demonstrate that the reserve price can
mitigate the cold-start problem in a posted price mechanism,
and thus can reduce the cumulative regret. Specifically, for
the pricing of noisy linear query, when n = 20 and t = 104,
our pricing mechanism with reserve price (resp., with reserve
price and uncertainty) reduces 13.16% (resp., 10.92%) of the
cumulative regret than without reserve price; for the pricing
of accommodation rental, as the reserve price is approaching
the market value, its impact on mitigating cold start is more
evident. These findings may be of independent interest in the
posted price mechanism design.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce technical preliminaries, and overview
design principles. In Section III, we present our pricing mecha-
nism under the fundamental linear model with uncertainty, and
then analyze its performance from the time and space com-
plexities together with the worst-case regret. In Section IV, we
extend to non-linear models and some other similar application
scenarios. We present the evaluation results in Section V. We
briefly review related work in Section VI, and conclude the
paper in Section VII.
II. TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
In this section, we introduce system model, problem formu-
lation, and design principles.
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 2, we consider a general system model for
online personal data markets. There are three kinds of entities:
data owners, a data broker, and data consumers.
The data broker first collects massive personal data from
data owners. Typical examples of personal data include prod-
uct ratings, electrical usages, social media data, health records,
physical activities, and driving trajectories. Then, the data
consumers comes to the data market in an online fashion.
In round t ∈ [T ], a data consumer arrives, and makes her
customized query Qt over the collected dataset. Specifically,
Qt comprises a concrete data analysis method and a tolerable
level of noise added to the true result [7], [8]. Here, the
noise perturbation can not only allow the data consumer to
control the accuracy of a returned answer, but also preserve
the privacies of data owners.
Depending on Qt and the underlying dataset, the data
broker quantifies the privacy leakage of each data owner, and
needs to compensate her if a deal occurs. Here, the individual
privacy compensation, which hinges on the contract between
the data owner and the data broker with respect to distinct
privacy leakages and corresponding compensations, can be
pre-computed when given Qt. The data broker then offers a
price pt to the data consumer. If pt is no more than the market
value vt of Qt, this posted price will be accepted. The data
broker charges the data consumer pt, returns the noisy answer,
and compensates the data owners as planned. Otherwise, this
deal is aborted, and the data consumer goes away. We note
that to guarantee non-negative utility at the data broker no
matter whether a deal occurs in round t or not, the posted
price pt should be no less than the total privacy compensation
qt, where qt functions as the reserve price of Qt.
B. Problem Formulation
We now formulate the regret minimization problem for
pricing sequential queries in online personal data markets.
We first model the market values of queries. We use an ele-
mentary assumption from contextual pricing in computational
economics [21]–[24] and hedonic pricing in marketing [25]–
[28], which states that the market value of a product is a
deterministic function of its features. Here, the product is a
query, and the function can be linear or non-linear. Besides,
to make the pricing model more robust, we allow for some
uncertainty in the market value of each query. In particular,
for a query Qt, we let xt ∈ Rn denote its n-dimensional
feature vector, let f : Rn 7→ R denote the mapping from the
feature vector xt to the deterministic part in its market value,
and let δt ∈ R denote the random variable in its market value,
which is independent of xt. In a nutshell, vt = f(xt) + δt.
We next identify the features of a query for measuring its
market value. One naive way is to directly encode the contents
of the query, including the data analysis method and the noise
level. However, the query alone, especially the data analysis
method, is hard to embody its economic value. Thus, we
turn to utilizing the underlying valuations from massive data
owners about the query, namely the privacy compensations, as
the feature vector. We give some comments on such a feature
representation: (1) The market value of a query depending
on the privacy compensations inherits the core principle of
cost-plus pricing [29], [30], and has been widely used in
personal data pricing [8], [17], [18]. In particular, cost-plus
pricing states that the market value of a product is determined
by adding a specific amount of markup to its cost. Here,
the cost is the total privacy compensation, the determinacy
is reflected in the feature representation, and the markup
is realized by setting the reserve price constraint. (2) The
privacy compensations, incorporating the factors of the data
analysis method, the noise level as well as the underlying
dataset, are observable by the data broker, and can help her
to discriminate the economic values of distinct queries. For
example, the privacy compensations are higher, which implies
that the privacy leakages to the data owners are larger, the
knowledge discovered by the data consumer is richer, and thus
the market value of the query to the data consumer should be
higher. (3) Considering the large scale of data owners, the
dimension of feature vector can be prohibitively high. Under
such circumstance, we can apply some celebrated dimensional-
ity reduction techniques, e.g., Principal Components Analysis
(PCA) [31], [32]. Yet, we can also apply aggregation/clustering
to the privacy compensations, and regard the aggregate results
as the feature vector, where its dimension n controls the gran-
ularity of aggregation. For example, we can sort the privacy
compensations, and evenly divide them into n partitions. We
sum the privacy compensations falling into a certain partition,
and thus obtain a feature. In this aggregation pattern, one
extreme case is n = 1, where the only feature is the total
privacy compensation. Another extreme case is n equal to the
number of data owners, where every feature corresponds to a
data owner’s individual privacy compensation.
We finally define the cumulative regret of the data broker
due to her limited knowledge of market values. We consider
a game between the data broker and an adversary. During
this game, the adversary chooses the sequence of queries
Q1, Q2, . . . , QT , selects the mapping f , but cannot control
the uncertainty δt in each round t, i.e., she can determine the
part f(xt) in the market value vt. In contrast, the data broker
can only passively receive each query Qt, and then post a price
pt. If the posted price is no more than the market value, i.e.,
pt ≤ vt, a deal occurs, and the data broker earns a revenue of
pt. Otherwise, the deal is aborted, and the data broker gains
no revenue. We define the regret in round t as the difference
between the adversary’s revenue and the data broker’s revenue
for trading the query Qt, i.e.,
Rt =
{
0 if qt > vt,
max
p∗t
p∗t Pr
δt
(p∗t ≤ vt)− pt1 {pt ≤ vt} otherwise.
Here, in the first branch, if the reserve price and thus the posted
price are higher than the market value, there is no regret.
This is because under such circumstance, no matter whether
the adversary knows the market value in advance or the data
broker does not, there is definitely no deal/revenue. Besides,
p∗t is the adversary’s optimal posted price to maximize her
expected revenue in round t, where the expectation is taken
over δt. When δt is omitted, the adversary will just post the
market value, if the reserve price is no more than the market
value, i.e., qt ≤ p∗t = vt, and Rt will change to:
Rt =
{
0 if qt > vt,
vt − pt1 {pt ≤ vt} otherwise.
(1)
At last, considering the queries can be chosen adversarially,
e.g., by other competitive data brokers or malicious data
consumers, our design goal is to minimize the total worst-
case regret accumulated over T rounds. Besides, good pricing
policies under the metric of worst-case regret would still be
robust to changes or fluctuations in the arrival pattern of
queries over time, e.g., some features of the queries can appear
in a correlated form, or have zero values throughout most of
rounds, but may be important in later rounds.
C. Design Principles
We give an overview of our proposed pricing framework,
and illustrate its key principles. We first consider the linear
market value model, where f is a linear function, parame-
terized by a weight vector θ∗ ∈ Rn. In other words, the
market value of the query Qt is vt = xtT θ∗. We then consider
extensions to the uncertain setting and non-linear models.
We start with a special case of the linear model, where each
feature vector xt is one-dimensional, i.e., n = 1. For example,
the single feature can be the total privacy compensation or
the reserve price qt, and the weight θ∗ denotes some fixed
but unknown revenue-to-cost ratio. We note that to minimize
the regret in pricing the query Qt, the data broker needs to
have a good estimation of its market value vt, which can
be equivalently converted to having a good knowledge of
θ∗. We let Kt denote the data broker’s knowledge set (or
intuitively, feasible values) of θ∗ in round t, e.g., the initial
knowledge set K1 can be an interval [`, u] for some `, u ∈ R.
Besides, after round t, if the posted price pt is rejected (resp.,
accepted), the data broker will update her knowledge set Kt to
Kt+1 = Kt
⋂{θ ∈ R|pt ≥ xtT θ} (resp., Kt+1 = Kt⋂{θ ∈
R|pt ≤ xtT θ}). Now, the key problem for the data broker is
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡2 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
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𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
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(c) Multi-Dimensional Scenario with Uncertainty
Fig. 3. Illustrations of (effective) exploratory posted prices under the linear market value model.
how to set the posted price pt. In fact, the knowledge set Kt
can impose a lower bound
¯
pt = minθ∈Kt xt
T θ and an upper
bound p¯t = maxθ∈Kt xt
T θ on estimating the market value vt
and thus on the posted price pt, while the reserve price qt
imposes the other lower bound on the posted price pt. If the
posted price pt is max(qt,
¯
pt), the data broker can sell the
query Qt with the highest probability. However, in the worst
case, where qt ≤
¯
pt, this deal will not refine the knowledge
set, i.e., Kt+1 = Kt, and thus cannot benefit the following
rounds. We call such a price max(qt,
¯
pt) a conservative price.
On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 3(a), inspired by bisection,
we define the larger value of the reserve price and the middle
price, namely max(qt, ¯
pt+p¯t
2 ), as an exploratory price. In the
worst case, the feedback from posting this price can narrow
down the knowledge set Kt by most, and thus can benefit
the subsequent rounds most. Of course, compared with the
conservative price, the exploratory price would suffer a higher
risk of no sale or losing the current revenue. Besides, we
note that both the conservative price and the exploratory price
have adequately exploited the experience from the previous
rounds, i.e., the latest knowledge set Kt, while the difference
is that these two types of posted prices give distinct biases to
the immediate rewards (exploitation) and the future rewards
(exploration). Yet, another key problem arisen is when the
data broker should choose which price. Our strategy is to
measure the size of the knowledge set Kt, e.g., the width
of interval in the one-dimensional case. If it exceeds some
threshold, the data broker chooses the exploratory price to
further improve her knowledge set; otherwise, her knowledge
set is near optimal, and she chooses the conservative price. In
our real design, we use p¯t −
¯
pt to capture the size of Kt, and
let  > 0 denote the threshold.
We further consider the general linear model with multiple
features, i.e., n ≥ 2. The holistic process is the same, whereas
the difference lies in the concrete form of the knowledge
set Kt. In the one-dimensional case, Kt is an interval, and
both the conservative price and the exploratory price can
be efficiently computed from Kt. However, when extended
to the multi-dimensional case, we assume that the initial
knowledge set is K1 = {θ ∈ Rn|`i ≤ θi ≤ ui, `i, ui ∈ R}.
Besides, after each round, the knowledge set is updated by
adding a linear inequality. Thus, the knowledge set Kt can
be viewed as a set of linear inequalities, whose cardinality is
non-decreasing with the number of rounds t. To post a price
in round t, it suffices to solve two linear programs under Kt,
which is quite time-consuming, and can be computationally
infeasible in online mode. Therefore, we turn to borrowing
some key principles from the celebrated ellipsoid method for
solving online linear programs, which was first proposed by
Khachiyan in 1979 [33]. The pivotal idea is to replace the
raw knowledge set Kt, viewed as a polytope in geometry,
with the ellipsoid Et of minimum volume that contains Kt.
This ellipsoid is normally referred to as the Lo¨wner-John
ellipsoid of the convex body Kt. In addition, by leveraging
the property that every ellipsoid is an image of the unit ball
under a bijective affine transformation [34], the data broker
can efficiently determine each posted price, and further update
her knowledge set, which only consume a few matrix-vector
and vector-vector multiplications. Fig. 3(b) gives an illustration
of the exploratory posted price in the two-dimensional case.
Here, the points on the dashed line, perpendicular to the
feature vector xt and tagged with a certain price, represent
those weight vectors to derive this price. Besides, in round
t, the data broker’s knowledge about the weight vector θ∗
comprises all the points in the yellow ellipsoid Et. Based on
Et, the data broker can compute a lower bound
¯
pt and an upper
bound p¯t on the market value vt. Given p¯t −
¯
pt exceeds the
threshold , the data broker should post the exploratory price
max(qt, ¯
pt+p¯t
2 ), i.e., the reserve price qt here. In addition, this
posted price is accepted by the data consumer, which implies
that the posted price is no more than the market value, i.e.,
pt = qt ≤ vt = xtT θ∗. This feedback enables the data broker
to refine her knowledge set Et, by excluding the region below
the cutting line {θ ∈ R2|pt = xtT θ}, which is marked with
grid. Furthermore, the new knowledge set Et+1 is obtained
by replacing the remaining region of Et with its Lo¨wner-John
ellipsoid, i.e., all the points in the blue ellipsoid.
We finally investigate the extensions to the uncertain setting
and non-linear models. First, for tractability, we make a
common assumption on the randomness δt in the market value
vt, where the distribution of δt belongs to subGaussian. We
thus bound the absolute value of any δt in all T rounds
by δ, with probability near 1. We regard δ as a “buffer”
in posting the price and updating the knowledge set, which
can circumvent the randomness δt in each round. Second, we
mainly investigate four classic non-linear models in market
value estimation, whose pattern is first applying an inner
feature mapping to the feature vector, then performing dot
product with the weight vector, and finally applying an outer
non-decreasing and continuous function. By still focusing
on the discovery of the weight vector rather than the inner
and outer non-linear functions, we can extend our pricing
mechanism to this class of non-linear market value models.
III. FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN UNDER LINEAR MARKET
VALUE MODEL
In this section, we first propose the ellipsoid based pricing
mechanism under the linear market value model, and then
extend to tolerate some uncertainty. We further analyze the
performance from the time and space complexities together
with the worst-case regret.
A. Ellipsoid based Pricing Mechanism
As an appetizer, we first briefly review the definition of an
ellipsoid and some of its key properties.
Definition 1. E ⊆ Rn is an ellipsoid, if there exists a vector
c ∈ Rn and a positive definite matrix A ∈ Rn×n such that:
E =
{
θ ∈ Rn
∣∣∣(θ − c)T A−1 (θ − c) ≤ 1} . (2)
Intuitively, c represents the center of the ellipsoid E , while
A portrays its shape. In particular, there are some useful
connections between the geometric properties of E and the
algebraic properties of A. We let γi(A) > 0 denote the i-th
largest eigenvalue of A. Then, the i-th widest axis (resp., its
width) of the ellipsoid E corresponds to the i-th eigenvector
(resp., 2
√
γi(A)). Besides, the volume of the ellipsoid E ,
denoted as V (E), only depends on the eigenvalues of A and
the dimension n. Specifically,
V (E) = Vn
√∏
i∈[n]
γi (A), (3)
where Vn denotes the volume of the unit ball in Rn, and is a
constant that only hinges on n.
We now present the ellipsoid based posted price mech-
anism with the reserve price constraint for online personal
data markets in Algorithm 1 (also called “the version with
reserve price” in our evaluation part). We recall that the initial
knowledge set of the data broker about the weight vector θ∗
is K1 = {θ ∈ Rn|`i ≤ θi ≤ ui, `i, ui ∈ R}. We choose a ball
centered at the origin with radius R =
√∑
i∈[n] max(`i
2, ui2)
to enclose K1. This ball can serve as the initial ellipsoid E1,
where A1 = R2In×n and c1 = 0n×1. In what follows, we
focus on a concrete round t. The data broker receives a query
Qt with the feature vector xt from a data consumer. Without
loss of generality, we assume that ∀t ∈ [T ], ‖xt‖ ≤ S for
Algorithm 1: Ellipsoid based Personal Data Pricing
Input: A1 = R2In×n, c1 = 0n×1, a threshold 
Output: Posted price pt in each round t ∈ [T ]
1 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
2 Et = {θ ∈ Rn| (θ − ct)T A−1t (θ − ct) ≤ 1};
3 Receive a query Qt with the feature vector xt ∈ Rn;
4 Determine the reserve price qt of Qt;
5 bt =
Atxt√
xtTAtxt
;
6
¯
pt = minθ∈Et xt
T θ = xt
T (ct − bt);
7 p¯t = maxθ∈Et xt
T θ = xt
T (ct + bt);
8 if qt ≥ p¯t then
9 At+1 = At; ct+1 = ct;
10 continue;
11 else
12 if p¯t −
¯
pt = 2
√
xtTAtxt >  then
13 Post the price pt = max
{
qt, ¯
pt+p¯t
2
= xt
T ct
}
;
14 αt =
¯
pt+p¯t
2
−pt√
xtTAtxt
= xt
T ct−pt√
xtTAtxt
;
15 if pt is rejected then
16 if − 1
n
≤ αt ≤ 0 then
17
At+1 =
n2
(
1− αt2
)
n2 − 1
(
At
− 2 (1 + nαt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)
btbt
T
)
;
ct+1 = ct − 1+nαtn+1 bt;
18 else
19 At+1 = At; ct+1 = ct;
20 else
21
At+1 =
n2
(
1− αt2
)
n2 − 1
(
At
− 2 (1− nαt)
(n+ 1) (1− αt)btbt
T
)
;
ct+1 = ct +
1−nαt
n+1
bt;
22 else
23 Post the price pt = max
{
qt,
¯
pt
}
;
24 At+1 = At; ct+1 = ct;
some S ≥ 1. Then, she virtually computes the total privacy
compensation allocated to the data owners as the reserve price
qt, which imposes a strict lower bound on the posted price
pt. Based on the knowledge set Et, the data broker can elicit
that the market value of the query Qt falls into a certain
interval, i.e., vt = xtT θ∗ ∈ [
¯
pt, p¯t] (Lines 5–7). If the reserve
price is no less than the maximum possible market value,
implying that the posted price should be no less than the
market value, i.e., pt ≥ qt ≥ p¯t ≥ vt, the query Qt cannot be
sold (Lines 8–10). Otherwise, the data broker judges whether
the difference between the maximum and minimum possible
market values, i.e., p¯t −
¯
pt, exceeds a threshold . If yes, she
posts the exploratory price (Lines 12–13). Otherwise, she posts
the conservative price (Lines 22–23). In fact, the posted price
places a cut on the ellipsoid Et, and splits it into two parts,
where the cutting hyperplane is {θ ∈ Rn|pt = xtT θ}. Besides,
the data broker can compute a parameter αt to locate the
position of the cut (Line 14). Formally, αt is interpreted as the
signed distance from the center ct to the cutting hyperplane,
measured in the space Rn endowed with the ellipsoidal norm
‖ · ‖At−1 [34], [35]. For example, if the posted price is the
middle price, i.e., pt = ¯
pt+p¯t
2 = xt
T ct, the center ct is on
the cutting hyperplane, and thus αt = 0. Moreover, according
to the feedback from the data consumer, the data broker can
decide to retain which side of the ellipsoid Et, and thus update
to its Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid Et+1, by computing the new shape
At+1 and center ct+1 (Lines 15–21). In particular, Gro¨tschel et
al. [34] have offered the formulas of At+1 and ct+1, when
the remaining part of Et is contained in the halfspace like
{θ ∈ Rn|pt ≥ xtT θ}. This corresponds to the rejection branch
(Lines 15–19). By the symmetry of ellipsoid, we can obtain the
formulas in the acceptance branch (Lines 20–21). Furthermore,
if the remaining part after a cut is exactly half of the ellipsoid
Et, we call the cut a central cut, if the remaining part is less
than half, we call it a deep cut, and if the remaining part is
more than half, we call it a shallow cut. Last but not least, it
is worth noting that the data broker is prohibited from refining
the ellipsoid with the conservative price (Line 24). The reason
is that p¯t−
¯
pt essentially probes the ellipsoid’s width along the
direction given by the feature vector xt (Please see Fig. 3(b)
for an intuition.), which is very small (≤ ) when posting
the conservative price. Suppose the data broker is allowed to
cut along this direction. By adversarially setting the reserve
prices, the width of ellipsoid along this direction can shrink
successively, while the widthes along other directions can
expand exponentially, which can result in O(T ) worst-case
regret. Details about the adversarial example and its regret
analysis are deferred to Lemma 8 in Appendix.
We finally discuss a special case, where Algorithm 1
executes without the reserve price constraint, hereinafter de-
noted as Algorithm 1* (also called “the pure version” in our
evaluation part). First, the exploratory posted price takes the
middle price ¯
pt+p¯t
2 , and poses a central cut over the ellipsoidEt. Second, the conservative posted price takes
¯
pt, which is
definitely no more than the market value vt, and must be
accepted by the data consumer. Besides, the conservative price
does not refine Et, and thus incurs a shallow cut. In a nutshell,
there is no deep cut in Algorithm 1*.
B. Incorporating Uncertainty
We now extend to the uncertain setting. We first make an
assumption on the random variable δt in the market value
model. We assume that the distribution of δt is σ-subGaussian,
i.e., there exists a constant C ∈ R such that
∀z > 0,Pr (|δt| > z) ≤ C exp
(
− z
2
2σ2
)
. (4)
This is a common assumption widely used in modeling
uncertainty [36]–[39]. In particular, many celebrated prob-
ability distributions, including normal distribution, uniform
distribution, Rademacher distribution, and bounded random
variables, are subGaussian. For example, normal distribution
is σ-subGaussian for its standard deviation σ and for C = 2.
Algorithm 2: Personal Data Pricing with Uncertainty
Input: A1 = R2In×n, c1 = 0n×1, an uncertainty parameter
δ =
√
2 logCσ log T , a threshold 
Output: Posted price pt in each round t ∈ [T ]
1 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
2 Et = {θ ∈ Rn| (θ − ct)T A−1t (θ − ct) ≤ 1};
3 Receive a query Qt with the feature vector xt ∈ Rn;
4 Determine the reserve price qt of Qt;
5 bt =
Atxt√
xtTAtxt
;
6
¯
pt = minθ∈Et xt
T θ = xt
T (ct − bt);
7 p¯t = maxθ∈Et xt
T θ = xt
T (ct + bt);
8 if qt ≥ p¯t + δ then
9 At+1 = At; ct+1 = ct;
10 continue;
11 else
12 if p¯t −
¯
pt = 2
√
xtTAtxt >  then
13 Post the price pt = max
{
qt, ¯
pt+p¯t
2
= xt
T ct
}
;
14 if pt is rejected then
15 αt =
¯
pt+p¯t
2
−(pt+δ)√
xtTAtxt
= xt
T ct−pt−δ√
xtTAtxt
;
16 if − 1
n
≤ αt ≤ 1 then
17
At+1 =
n2
(
1− αt2
)
n2 − 1
(
At
− 2 (1 + nαt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)
btbt
T
)
;
ct+1 = ct − 1+nαtn+1 bt;
18 else
19 At+1 = At; ct+1 = ct;
20 else
21 αt =
¯
pt+p¯t
2
−(pt−δ)√
xtTAtxt
= xt
T ct−pt+δ√
xtTAtxt
;
22 if − 1
n
≤ −αt ≤ 1 then
23
At+1 =
n2
(
1− αt2
)
n2 − 1
(
At
− 2 (1− nαt)
(n+ 1) (1− αt)btbt
T
)
;
ct+1 = ct +
1−nαt
n+1
bt;
24 else
25 At+1 = At; ct+1 = ct;
26 else
27 Post the price pt = max
{
qt,
¯
pt − δ
}
;
28 At+1 = At; ct+1 = ct;
We then assign a value δ =
√
2 logCσ log T to the variable z
in Equation (4), and thus get:
Pr (|δt| > δ) ≤ T− log T . (5)
We further apply Boole’s inequality to the above inequality
for all t ∈ [T ], and derive:
∃t ∈ [T ],Pr (|δt| > δ) ≤ T 1−log T
⇒ ∀t ∈ [T ],Pr (|δt| ≤ δ) ≥ 1− T 1−log T ≥ 1− 1/T,
(6)
where the last inequality holds for T ≥ 8.
From Equation (6), we can draw that in each round t, the
randomness δt in the market value vt is bounded by δ in
absolute value with probability at least 1 − 1/T . Therefore,
when posting the price and updating the knowledge set, we let
the data broker introduce a “buffer” of size δ to circumvent
the randomness δt. Specifically, if the data broker posts the
price pt and observes a rejection, she can no longer infer that
pt ≥ xtT θ∗. Instead, she should infer that pt ≥ vt = xtT θ∗−
δt ≥ xtT θ∗−δ. In a similar way, if she observes an acceptance,
she will infer that pt ≤ vt = xtT θ∗ + δt ≤ xtT θ∗ + δ rather
than pt ≤ xtT θ∗. Intuitively, in the case of rejection (resp.,
acceptance), the data broker imagines that she had posted pt+δ
(resp., pt−δ). We call pt+δ (resp., pt−δ) the effective posted
price in the case of rejection (resp., acceptance).
We now present the robust pricing mechanism in Algo-
rithm 2 (also called “the version with reserve price and
uncertainty” in our evaluation part). For the sake of concise-
ness, we mainly illustrate the differences from Algorithm 1.
First, in Lines 8–10, the condition for a certain no deal
changes into qt ≥ p¯t + δ. Only under this condition, the
posted price must be no less than the market value, since
pt ≥ qt ≥ p¯t + δ ≥ vt = xtT θ∗+ δt. Second, in Lines 15 and
21, we utilize the effective exploratory prices to compute the
positions of the cutting hyperplanes. In particular, due to the
uncertainty in the market value, if the data broker posts the
same price, the feedback from the data consumer can result in
a smaller refinement of the knowledge set, i.e., the depth of
the cut over the ellipsoid decreases. We provide Fig. 3(c) for a
visual comparison with Fig. 3(b), where Fig. 3(c) incorporates
the uncertainty, while Fig. 3(b) does not. Third, in Line 27,
the conservative posted price, involving
¯
pt, decreases by δ to
keep its high acceptance ratio.
We finally investigate Algorithm 2 without the reserve price
constraint, hereinafter denoted as Algorithm 2* (also called
“the version with uncertainty” in our evaluation part). First,
the exploratory posted price is still the middle price ¯
pt+p¯t
2 .
Besides, the effective exploratory price used in refining the
ellipsoid is ¯
pt+p¯t
2 +δ (resp., ¯
pt+p¯t
2 −δ) in the case of rejection
(resp., acceptance), and the corresponding position parameter
αt is −δ/
√
xtTAtxt (resp., δ/
√
xtTAtxt). If δ > 0, the
effective exploratory prices will refine the ellipsoid less than
half. Furthermore, the new ellipsoids Et+1’s obtained in the
cases of acceptance and rejection are symmetric according
to the hyperplane through the center of the old ellipsoid Et,
namely {θ ∈ Rn|xtT θ = xtT ct}. Second, the conservative
posted price is
¯
pt − δ, and can be either rejected or accepted.
Here, the rejection case happens when the market value is
outside the interval [
¯
pt − δ, p¯t + δ], and has probability no
more than 1/T from Equation (6). Besides, the conservative
price keeps the ellipsoid unchanged. Jointly considering two
types of posted prices, we can find that if the uncertainty in the
market value is incorporated, i.e., δ > 0, Algorithm 2* only
has shallow cuts. Of course, when the uncertainty is ignored
by setting δ = 0, the above analysis degenerates to the analysis
of Algorithm 1* at the end of Section III-A.
C. Performance Analysis
We analyze the performance of Algorithm 2 from its time
and space complexities as well as worst-case regret.
1) Time and Space Complexities: Considering the data
broker needs to run the posted price mechanism in online
mode, Algorithm 2 should be quite efficient in each iteration.
We analyze its single-round complexity from the computation
and memory overheads.
First, the computation overhead of the data broker in a
round of data trading mainly comes from two parts: one is
to determine the posted price pt, which roughly consumes 2
matrix-vector and 3 vector-vector multiplications; the other is
to update the shape and the center of the ellipsoid, which
roughly consumes 1 vector-vector multiplication in the worst
case. Thus, the time complexity is O(n2). Second, the memory
overhead of the data broker is mainly caused by maintaining
the knowledge set Et, or alteratively the shape and the center
of the ellipsoid, which requires one n×n matrix and one n×1
vector, respectively. Hence, the space complexity is O(n2).
In conclusion, our proposed pricing mechanism has a light
load, and can apply to online personal data markets. We shall
report the detailed overheads in Section V-D.
2) Worst-Case Regret: We analyze the worst-case regret of
Algorithm 2, which is O(max(n2 log(T/n), n3 log(T/n)/T ))
under the low uncertain setting δ = O(n/T ), namely Theo-
rem 1. We first prove that the existence of reserve price cannot
increase the regret of a posted price mechanism in single round
(Lemma 1). Thus, we can use Algorithm 2 without the reserve
price constraint, namely Algorithm 2*, as a springboard. In
particular, to get an upper bound on the cumulative regret of
Algorithm 2, we need to derive an upper bound on the number
of rounds where the exploratory prices are posted. We derive
this upper bound in a roundabout way: we first obtain the
upper bound in Algorithm 2* (Lemma 6), and further prove
that it still holds in Algorithm 2 by reduction and analyzing
the impact of reserve price (Lemma 7). We elicit Lemma 6 in a
squeezing manner, particularly through constructing an upper
bound and a lower bound on the final volume of the ellipsoid.
For the upper bound, we adopt a core technique in proving
the convergence of the celebrated ellipsoid method: the ratio
between the volumes of an ellipsoid and the Lo¨wner-John
ellipsoid after a cut has an upper bound (Lemma 2). Regarding
the lower bound, we resort to the formula for computing an
ellipsoid’s volume by multiplying all the eigenvalues of its
shape matrix. Thus, we can find a lower bound on the volume,
by constructing a lower bound on the smallest eigenvalue
(Lemmas 4 and 5). The cornerstone of these two lemmas is
the linear algebra machinery in Lemma 3, which captures how
the smallest eigenvalue changes after a matrix is modified by
a rank-one matrix. In what follows, we present, prove, and
clarify the detailed lemmas and theorem in a bottom-up way.
Lemma 1. The existence of reserve price cannot increase the
regret of a posted price mechanism in single round.
Proof. We let vt denote the market value, let qt denote the
reserve price, let p′t denote the pure posted price, and let pt
denote the posted price with the reserve price constraint, i.e.,
pt = max(qt, p
′
t). We can express the regret of the posted
price mechanism without reserve price in round t as:
R′t = vt − p′t1 {p′t ≤ vt} . (7)
After introducing the reserve price constraint, the regret
changes to Rt given in Equation (1). We now prove Rt ≤ R′t
in two complementary cases: qt > vt and qt ≤ vt.
Case 1 (qt > vt): We can derive that Rt = 0 ≤ R′t.
Case 2 (qt ≤ vt): We can derive that:
Rt = vt − pt1 {pt ≤ vt}
= vt −max (qt, p′t)1 {max (qt, p′t) ≤ vt}
= vt −max (qt, p′t)1 {p′t ≤ vt} (8)
≤ vt − p′t1 {p′t ≤ vt} (9)
= R′t,
where Equation (8) follows from that under the antecedent
qt ≤ vt, the conditional statement {max(qt, p′t) ≤ vt ⇔ qt ≤
vt and p′t ≤ vt} can be simplified to p′t ≤ vt. Besides, the
inequality in Equation (9) follows from the maximum function,
and takes equal sign when qt ≤ p′t.
Jointly considering the above two cases, we complete the
proof.
According to Lemma 1, for the worst-case regret analysis of
Algorithm 2, we can use Algorithm 2* as its stepping stone.
Besides, given the worst-case cumulative regret is obtained
under the condition that all the exploratory prices are rejected,
we shall focus on the rejection branch of Algorithm 2 (Lines
14–19). Specifically, the position parameter αt will utilize the
formula in Line 15. Of course, by symmetry, the analysis of the
acceptance branch can be similarly derived. Moreover, our key
strategy of the following regret analysis is to identify an upper
bound on the number of the rounds where the data broker posts
the exploratory prices in Algorithm 2*, and further show this
upper bound still holds in Algorithm 2. This converts to tracing
the evolution of the ellipsoid’s volume, particularly its upper
bound and lower bound.
We first introduce a well-studied lemma to construct the
upper bound on the ellipsoid’s final volume, which is the
basis for proving the convergence of the conventional ellipsoid
method [34] in the field of convex optimization.
Lemma 2. Let Et denote an ellipsoid, and let Et+1 denote the
Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid obtained after a cut over Et with the
position parameter αt. If αt ∈ [−1/n, 0], we have:
V (Et+1)
V (Et) ≤ exp
(
− (1 + nαt)
2
5n
)
. (10)
We next build the lower bound on the ellipsoid’s final
volume, through monitoring how the smallest eigenvalue of
its shape matrix changes. Before that, we introduce a corner-
stone, a lemma from [40], [41], to help bound the smallest
eigenvalue, if a matrix is modified by another matrix of rank
one, e.g., a vector-vector multiplication. In fact, a matrix
modified by another rank-one matrix is the update pattern of
the ellipsoid’s shape matrix in Algorithm 2 (Lines 17 and 23).
Besides, the building block of this lemma is the characteristic
polynomial of a square matrix in linear algebra.
Lemma 3. Let An×n be a symmetric matrix, and let γn(A)
denote its smallest eigenvalue. Let D = A−βbbT for β > 0
and b ∈ Rn, let γn(D) denote its smallest eigenvalue, and let
ϕD(z) denote its characteristic polynomial with the variable
z ∈ R. In particular, when z is not one of the eigenvalues of
A, i.e., z 6= γi(A)∀i ∈ [n], ϕD(z) can be expressed as:
ϕD (z) = det (D− zIn×n) =
∏
j∈[n]
(γj (A)− z)ψD (z) ,
where
ψD (z) = 1− β
∑
i∈[n]
bi
2
γi (A)− z . (11)
Then, we have:
∀z < γn (A) , ϕD (z) > 0⇒ γn (D) ≥ z. (12)
Based on Lemma 3, we further give the following two
lemmas to construct a lower bound on the smallest eigenvalue
of the final ellipsoid’s shape matrix, and thus obtain a lower
bound on its volume. In particular, Lemma 4 shows that if
the smallest eigenvalue is below some threshold, namely τ2,
it can no longer decrease. Lemma 5 reveals that in each
round, the smallest eigenvalue cannot decrease sharply, to
its n
2(1−αt)2
(n+1)2 at most. Therefore, the smallest eigenvalue is
bounded below by τ2 n
2(1−αt)2
(n+1)2 . In terms of geometry, these
two lemmas follow from that the difference p¯t −
¯
pt monitors
the width of the ellipsoid along the direction given by the fea-
ture vector xt, and if it is below the threshold , the data broker
will post the conservative price rather than the exploratory
price to avoid shortening the width along this direction. Hence,
the smallest eigenvalue, having a correspondence with the
width of the ellipsoid’s narrowest axis, cannot become too
small.
Lemma 4. In Algorithm 2* ( ≥ 4nδ), there exists τ ∈ R,
such that γn(At) ≤ τ2,xtTAtxt > 2/4 ⇒ γn(At+1) ≥
γn(At). Besides, τ = 1400n2S4 is a feasible solution.
Proof. We recall that if xtTAtxt > 2/4, indicating p¯t−
¯
pt =
2
√
xtTAtxt > , the data broker will utilize the effective
exploratory price to cut the ellipsoid, where the position pa-
rameter is αt = −δ/
√
xtTAtxt in the case of rejection. Since
 ≥ 4nδ, implying 0 ≤ δ ≤ 4n , we have αt ∈ [− 12n , 0]. Be-
sides, from Algorithm 2, we can get At+1 =
n2(1−αt2)
n2−1 D for
D = At− 2(1+nαt)(n+1)(1+αt)btbt
T , where bt = Atxt/
√
xtTAtxt.
For convenience, we transform to the base of At’s eigenvalues
as follows. By using eigendecomposition, we can express
At = ΨΛΨ
T , (13)
where Ψ is an orthogonal matrix composed of eigenvectors
of At, and Λ is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of
At in its main diagonal. By convention, we sort the diagonal
entries of Λ in descending order, which implies that the i-th
diagonal entry of Λ is γi(At) and the i-th column of Ψ is the
corresponding eigenvector. We then define A′t+1 = Ψ
TAt+1Ψ
and D′ = ΨTDΨ. We can obtain A′t+1 =
n2(1−αt2)
n2−1 D
′ and
D′ = Λ− 2(1+nαt)(n+1)(1+αt)b′b′
T . Here, b′ = Ψbt = Λd/
√
dTΛd,
where d = ΨTxt.
Due to the fact that the eigenvalues of any square matrix
are invariant under the changing base, we have γn(At+1) =
γn(A
′
t+1) =
n2(1−αt2)
n2−1 γn(D) =
n2(1−αt2)
n2−1 γn(D
′). Now, our
task is to prove that under the antecedents γn(At) ≤ τ2 and
xt
TAtxt > 
2/4, the consequent γn(At+1) ≥ γn(At), or
equivalently γn(D′) ≥ n2−1n2(1−αt2)γn(At), holds. By Lemma 3
(β takes the value 2(1+nαt)(n+1)(1+αt) ), we only need to show that
ϕD′(
n2−1
n2(1−αt2)γn(At)) ≥ 0. Given αt ∈ [− 12n , 0], we have
n2−1
n2(1−αt2)γn(At) ≤ n
2−1
n2 γn(At) < γn(At). Therefore, it
suffices to show that: ψD′( n
2−1
n2(1−αt2)γn(At)) ≥ 0. We utilize
b′i =
γi(At)di√∑
j∈[n] γj(At)dj
2
to expand ψD′( n
2−1
n2(1−αt2)γn(At)) as:
ψD′
(
n2 − 1
n2 (1− αt2)γn (At)
)
= 1− 2 (1 + nαt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)
∑
i∈[n]
b′i
2
γi (At)− n2−1n2(1−αt2)γn (At)
= 1− 2 (1 + nαt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)∑
i∈[n]
γi (At) di
2∑
j∈[n] γj (At) dj
2
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
γn(At)
γi(At)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS=LHS1(i:γi(At)<
√
τ2)+LHS2(i:γi(At)≥√τ2)
. (14)
Depending on whether γi(At) is less than
√
τ2 or not, we
split LHS in Equation (14) into LHS1 and LHS2, and further
give upper bounds on these two parts, separately.
LHS1 =
∑
i:γi(At)<
√
τ2
γi (At) di
2∑
j∈[n] γj (At) dj
2
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
γn(At)
γi(At)
,
≤
∑
i:γi(At)<
√
τ2
√
τ2di
2
2/4
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
(15)
= 4
√
τ
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
∑
i:γi(At)<
√
τ2
di
2
≤ 4√τ 1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
∑
i∈[n]
di
2
= 4
√
τ
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
xt
TΨTΨxt
= 4
√
τ
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
xt
Txt (16)
≤ 4√τ 1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
S2. (17)
Here, the inequality in Equation (15) follows from γi(At) <√
τ2 and
∑
j∈[n] γj(At)dj
2 = xt
TAtxt > 
2/4 in the
antecedents, and γn(At) ≤ γi(At). Besides, Equation (16)
follows from the orthogonality of Ψ. Moreover, the inequality
in Equation (17) follows from ‖xt‖ ≤ S.
LHS2 =
∑
i:γi(At)≥√τ2
γi (At) di
2∑
j∈[n] γj (At) dj
2
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
γn(At)
γi(At)
≤
∑
i:γi(At)≥√τ2
γi (At) di
2∑
j∈[n] γj (At) dj
2
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
√
τ
=
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
√
τ
∑
i:γi(At)≥√τ2
γi (At) di
2∑
j∈[n] γj (At) dj
2
≤ 1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
√
τ
∑
i∈[n]
γi (At) di
2∑
j∈[n] γj (At) dj
2
=
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
√
τ
,
where the first inequality follows from γn (At) ≤ τ2 in the
antecedent and γi (At) ≥
√
τ2.
By combining two upper bounds on LHS1 and LHS2, we
finally derive a lower bound on ψD′( n
2−1
n2(1−αt2)γn(At)) as the
parameter τ approaches 0:
ψD′
(
n2 − 1
n2 (1− αt2)γn (At)
)
= 1− 2 (1 + nαt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)
(LHS1 + LHS2)
≥ 1− 2 (1 + nαt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)
(
4
√
τS2
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
+
1
1− n2−1n2(1−αt2)
√
τ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1, as αt∈[− 12n ,0] and limτ→0
≥ 1− 2 (1 + nαt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)
=
(n− 1) (1− αt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)
≥ 0.
In addition, we can check τ = 1400n2S4 is a feasible value to let
the lower bound and thus the original ψD′( n
2−1
n2(1−αt2)γn(At))
be no less than 0. This completes the proof.
Lemma 5. For any round t in Algorithm 2* ( ≥ 4nδ),
where the data broker posts the exploratory price, we have:
γn(At+1) ≥ n
2(1−αt)2
(n+1)2 γn (At).
Proof. We continue to use the notations in the proof of
Lemma 4. We need to prove γn(At+1) ≥ n
2(1−αt)2
(n+1)2 γn(At).
It suffices to prove γn(At+1) =
n2(1−αt2)
n2−1 γn(D
′) ≥
n2(1−αt)2
(n+1)2 γn(At), or γn(D
′) ≥ (n−1)(1−αt)(n+1)(1+αt)γn(At). By
Lemma 3, it suffices to prove ϕD′
(
(n−1)(1−αt)
(n+1)(1+αt)
γn(At)
)
≥
0. Given αt ∈ [− 12n , 0], we have: (n−1)(1−αt)(n+1)(1+αt)γn(At) ≤
2n2−n−1
2n2+n−1γn(At) < γn(At). Thus, we only need to prove
ψD′
(
(n−1)(1−αt)
(n+1)(1+αt)
γn(At)
)
≥ 0, which holds as follows.
ψD′
(
(n− 1) (1− αt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)
γn (At)
)
= 1− 2 (1 + nαt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)∑
i∈[n]
γi (At) di
2∑
j∈[n] γj (At) dj
2
1
1− (n−1)(1−αt)(n+1)(1+αt)
γn(At)
γi(At)
≥ 1− 2 (1 + nαt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)
max
i∈[n]
1
1− (n−1)(1−αt)(n+1)(1+αt)
γn(At)
γi(At)
(18)
= 1− 2 (1 + nαt)
(n+ 1) (1 + αt)
1
1− (n−1)(1−αt)(n+1)(1+αt)
γn(At)
γn(At)
(19)
= 0.
Here, the inequality in Equation (18) follows from that the
terms γi(At)di
2∑
j∈[n] γj(At)dj
2 ’s stand for the coefficients of a convex
combination of elements, which can be bounded above by the
maximum element. Besides, Equation (19) follows from that
γn(At) is the smallest eigenvalue.
By combining the upper and lower bounds on the final
ellipsoid’s volume, we can derive an upper bound on the
number of rounds where the exploratory prices are posted,
hereinafter denoted as Te, in Algorithm 2*.
Lemma 6. Algorithm 2* ( ≥ 4nδ) chooses the exploratory
prices in at most 20n2 log(20RS2(n+ 1)/) rounds.
Proof. In Algorithm 2*, each effective exploratory price incurs
a cut with the position parameter αt ∈ [− 12n , 0] over the
ellipsoid, while each conservative price keeps the ellipsoid
unchanged. We next give an upper bound and a lower bound
on the ratio between the volumes of the final and the initial
ellipsoids, namely V (ET+1)/V (E1).
For the upper bound, by Lemma 2, after each round t where
the exploratory price is posted, we have:
V (Et+1)
V (Et) ≤ exp
(
− (1 + nαt)
2
5n
)
≤ exp
(
− 1
20n
)
, (20)
where the last inequality takes equal sign at αt = − 12n . Hence,
after T rounds, we can derive that:
V (ET+1)
V (E1) ≤ exp
(
− Te
20n
)
. (21)
Regarding the lower bound, by Lemmas 4 and 5, we have:
γn (AT+1) ≥ τ2n
2(1− αt)2
(n+ 1)2
≥ τ2 n
2
(n+ 1)2
, (22)
where the last inequality takes equal sign at αt = 0. Corre-
spondingly, we can obtain a lower bound on V (ET+1):
V (ET+1) = Vn
√√√√ n∏
i
γi (AT+1) ≥ Vn
(√
τ
n
n+ 1
)n
. (23)
Besides, the initial ellipsoid E1 is an n-dimensional ball with
radius R, whose volume is VnRn. Therefore, we can derive a
lower bound on V (ET+1)/V (E1):
V (ET+1)
V (E1) ≥
(√
τ
R
n
n+ 1
)n
. (24)
By using the inequality that the upper bound is no less than
the lower bound, we can get an upper bound on Te:(√
τ
R
n
n+ 1
)n
≤ exp
(
− Te
20n
)
⇒ Te ≤ 20n2 log
(
R√
τ
n+ 1
n
)
.
(25)
We note that this upper bound holds for any feasible τ . When
τ takes the value 1400n2S4 from Lemma 4, we have:
Te ≤ 20n2 log
(
20RS2 (n+ 1) /
)
. (26)
This completes the proof.
We finally analyze the worst-case regret of Algorithm 2.
Before that, we restate Lemma 6 for Algorithm 2, by analyzing
the impact of the reserve price constraint on Te.
Lemma 7. Algorithm 2 ( ≥ 4nδ) chooses the exploratory
prices in at most 20n2 log(20RS2(n+ 1)/) rounds.
Proof. We recall that if the reserve price qt is introduced in
round t, the exploratory posted price is pt = max(qt, ¯
pt+p¯t
2 ),
the effective exploratory price is pt + δ in the rejection case,
and its position parameter can be computed via αt = (¯
pt+p¯t
2 −
(pt + δ))/
√
xtTAtxt (Algorithm 2, Line 15). We now prove
Lemma 7 in two complementary cases as follows.
Case 1 (¯
pt+p¯t
2 ≥ qt): The posted price is the middle price,
i.e., pt = ¯
pt+p¯t
2 . Algorithm 2 degenerates to Algorithm 2*,
and Lemma 7 holds from Lemma 6.
Case 2 (qt > ¯
pt+p¯t
2 ): The posted price is the reserve price,
i.e., pt = qt. Given the reserve price is rejected, we can draw
that the reserve price is higher than the market value, i.e., pt =
qt > vt, which further implies that Rt = 0 from Equation (1).
Suppose the data broker does not utilize the reserve price to
refine the ellipsoid in this round. The analysis of Algorithm 2
can be reduced to analyzing Algorithm 2* with the number
of total rounds T − 1 plus one dummy round inserted in
the t-th round. Considering Lemma 6 does not rely on the
number of total rounds, Te ≤ 20n2 log(20RS2(n+ 1)/) still
holds in Algorithm 2. However, in Algorithm 2 (Lines 14–19),
the data broker needs to cut the ellipsoid using the effective
exploratory price, i.e., qt + δ here. We thus need to analyze
the impact of such a cut on Te. In particular, following the
guidelines in proving Lemma 6, to prove Lemma 7, it suffices
to prove that this cut cannot increase the upper bound on the
final volume of the ellipsoid, and meanwhile, cannot decrease
the lower bound. First, the effective exploratory price imposes
a cut over the ellipsoid, and thus cannot increase the final
volume together with the upper bound on the final volume.
Second, in Equation (22), the lower bound on the smallest
eigenvalue of the final ellipsoid’s shape matrix is obtained at
αt = 0. Besides, we can check that a negative αt increases the
lower bound. Therefore, the effective exploratory price qt+ δ,
holding a negative αt = (¯
pt+p¯t
2 − (qt + δ))/
√
xtTAtxt <
−δ/
√
xtTAtxt < 0, cannot decrease the lower bound on the
final volume of the ellipsoid.
By summarizing two cases, we complete the proof.
Theorem 1. If δ = O(n/T ), then the worst-case regret of
Algorithm 2 is O(max(n2 log(T/n), n3 log(T/n)/T )).1
Proof. First, as we illustrated in the paragraph below Equa-
tion (6), in each round t, the absolute value of the random
variable δt has probability at most 1/T outside δ. Thus, the
cumulative regret incurred by removing the weight vector θ∗
from the knowledge set is at most maxxt,θ∗ xt
T θ∗T/T = RS.
Second, we analyze the cumulative regret due to the posted
prices. In round t, the regret incurred by posting the ex-
ploratory (resp., conservative) price can be bounded above
by p¯t + δ (resp., (p¯t + δ) − (
¯
pt − δ)), which can be further
bounded above by RS+δ (resp., +2δ). Thus, the cumulative
regret is no more than Te(RS + δ) + (T − Te)( + 2δ).
When δ = O(n/T ), Te takes its upper bound 20n2 log(20RS2
(n+ 1)/) from Lemma 7, and  is set to max(n2/T, 4nδ) =
O(n2/T ), the worst-case regret incurred by the posted prices
is O(max(n2 log(T/n), n3 log(T/n)/T )).
By adding the above two parts, the worst-case regret of
Algorithm 2 is O(max(n2 log(T/n), n3 log(T/n)/T )). This
completes the proof.
IV. EXTENSIONS
In this section, we extend our proposed pricing framework
under the fundamental linear model to some other non-linear
models. We also discuss how to support several other similar
application scenarios.
A. Non-linear Market Value Models
We mainly investigate four kinds of non-linear models
commonly used in measuring market values. The first two are
the log-log and log-linear models in hedonic pricing from real
estate and property studies [25]–[28], which can be formalized
as log vt =
∑
i∈[n] log(xt,i)θ
∗
i and log vt = xt
T θ∗, respec-
tively. Here, xt,i and θ∗i denote the i-th elements of the feature
vector xt and the weight vector θ∗, respectively. The other two
models are the logistic model [42]–[44] and the kernelized
model [45] in online advertising, which can be formalized
as vt = 1/(1 + exp(xtT θ∗)) and vt =
∑t−1
k=1K(xt,xk)θ
∗
k,
respectively. Here, K(·, ·) is a Mercer kernel operator.
We can further observe that the above four non-linear
models can be unified to a general class of non-linear models:
vt = g
(
φ (xt)
T
θ∗
)
, (27)
1The regret analysis in the one-dimensional case is deferred to Theorem 3
in Appendix. Besides, our regret analyses in this work focus on the terms,
involving the dimension of the feature vector n and the number of total rounds
T , and ignore other constant terms.
where g : R 7→ R is a non-decreasing and continuous function,
e.g., in the two hedonic pricing models, g is the natural expo-
nential function; in the logistic model, g is the logistic sigmoid
function; in the kernelized model, g is the identity function.
Besides, φ : Rn 7→ Rm represents a feature mapping of the
original feature vector xt, which intends to capture non-linear
correlations/dependencies among the different features of xt
and the different feature vectors within t rounds. For example,
in the log-log model, φ denotes applying the natural logarithm
function to each element of xt; in the kernelized model,
m = t−1 and φ stands for the kernel function K; in the other
two models, φ denotes the identity map. Furthermore, it is
worth noting that both g and φ are public knowledge, and only
the weight vector θ∗ is unknown. Therefore, by regarding the
domain of θ∗ as the knowledge set to be refined, our proposed
pricing mechanism under the linear model can still apply to
the above class of non-linear models. Specifically, φ(xt) now
functions as the new feature vector, and the threshold  is used
to control p¯t −
¯
pt, i.e., the difference between the maximum
and minimum possible values of φ(xt)T θ, where θ belongs to
the data broker’s knowledge set. In addition, the data broker
will post the price g(pt) rather than the original pt. We finally
analyze the worst-case regret of Algorithm 2 when adapted to
the above class of non-linear models.
Theorem 2. Let g : R 7→ R denote a non-decreasing and
continuous function with Lipschitz constant L. Let φ : Rn 7→
Rm denote a mapping of the feature vector xt such that
‖φ(xt)‖ ≤ U for some U ∈ R, and let θ∗ denote the
weight vector over φ(xt) such that ‖θ∗‖ ≤ R. If the market
value takes the form vt = g(φ(xt)T θ∗), and the uncertainty
parameter δ = O(n/T ), the worst-case regret of the adapted
Algorithm 2 is O(max(n2 log(T/n), n3 log(T/n)/T )).
Proof. First, the cumulative regret incurred by removing
the weight vector θ∗ from the knowledge set is at most
g(RU)T/T = g(RU).
Second, we analyze the cumulative regret caused by the
posted prices. In round t, the regret incurred by posting
the exploratory (resp., conservative) price is no more than
g(p¯t + δ) (resp., g(p¯t + δ)− g(
¯
pt − δ)), which can be further
bounded above by g(RU + δ) (resp., L((p¯t+ δ)− (
¯
pt− δ)) ≤
L( + 2δ)). Therefore, the cumulative regret is no more than
Teg(RU + δ) + (T − Te)L( + 2δ). When δ = O(n/T ), Te
takes its upper bound 20n2 log(20RU2(n + 1)/) (here, U
replaces S in Lemma 7 for the new feature vector φ(xt)), and
 = O(n2/T ), the cumulative regret incurred by the posted
prices is O(max(n2 log(T/n), n3 log(T/n)/T )).
By adding the above two parts, we complete the proof.
B. Supporting Other Application Scenarios
We first outline the characteristics of the pricing problem in
online personal data markets. We then point out some other
similar application scenarios in practice, and further illustrate
how to support them with our proposed pricing mechanism
under different market value models.
In data markets, the data broker is the seller, and each
data consumer is a buyer. Besides, the sequential queries, as
the products to be sold, have three atypical characteristics:
(1) Customization: The queries, requested by different data
consumers, are highly differentiated; (2) Existence of reserve
price: The total privacy compensation, allocated to the under-
lying data owners, serves as the reserve price of a query; (3)
Timeliness: If no deal occurs in a round, the query will vanish,
generating regret at the data broker.
Several other products in practice share one or more charac-
teristics listed above, which implies that our proposed pricing
mechanism for personal data markets can be extended to these
scenarios. One example is hospitality service on booking plat-
forms, e.g., Airbnb, Wimdu, and Workaway. A tourist can raise
some requirements on her desirable accommodation, such as
location, the numbers of bedrooms and bathrooms, amenities,
reviews, historical occupancy rate, and so on. Meanwhile, the
host of the house can set a minimum/reserve price for the
accommodation. If the house is not rented out at a certain date,
it may cause regret at both the host and the booking platform.
We can observe that the host, the booking platform, and the
tourist, play similar roles to the data owner, the data broker,
and the data consumer in data markets, respectively. Besides,
the market value of the accommodation can be well interpreted
by the linear or log-linear model [28]. Yet, another example
is online advertising on web publishers. Here, we consider
a novel scenario, where the impressions are traded through
posting prices rather than the ad auctions already adopted
by Internet giants, e.g., Google, Microsoft, and Facebook.
In particular, an advertiser can customize her need of an
impression, e.g., position and target audience. If the impression
is not sold within a given time frame, it will generate regret
at the web publisher. We note that the web visitors who
generate impressions, the web publisher, and the advertiser,
play similar roles to the data owners, the data broker, and
the data consumer in data markets, respectively. Besides, the
market value of an impression is normally measured by its
click-through rate (CTR), which can be effectively captured
by the logistic [42]–[44] or kernelized model [45]. Last but
not least example is loan application from banks and other
financial institutions, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank, Wells Fargo,
and Lending Club. A borrower intends to request a certain
amount of loan. Based on the situations of the borrower,
including the credit score, employment status, and property
state, a financial institution determines whether to approve the
application and at which interest rate. Of course, the borrower
can also accept or reject the loan offer. The case of rejection
may incur regret at the financial institution. Here, the financial
institution and the borrower play similar roles to the data
broker and the data consumer in data markets, respectively.
In addition, the interest rate of a loan can be captured by the
linear or log-log model [46], [47].
In conclusion, our proposed pricing mechanism is not just
limited to online personal data trading, and can also support
other application scenarios with common characteristics.
V. EVALUATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the evaluation results of our
pricing mechanism from practical regret and overhead.
We use three real-world datasets, including MovieLens 20M
dataset [48], Airbnb listings in U.S. major cities [49], and
Avazu mobile ad click dataset [50], to evaluate our pricing
mechanism over noisy linear queries, accommodation rentals,
and impressions, under the linear, log-linear, logistic market
value models, respectively. First, the MovieLens dataset con-
tains 20, 000, 263 ratings of 27, 278 movies made by 138, 493
anonymous users between January 9, 1995 and March 31,
2015. Second, the Airbnb dataset provides a list of 74, 111
booking records from year 2008 to year 2017 in 6 U.S. cities,
i.e., New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington,
Chicago, and Boston. Besides, each record contains a user id,
the logarithmic lodging price, house type, location, amenities,
host response rate, cancellation policy, and so on. Third, the
Avazu dataset comprises 10 days of click-through data, in
total 404, 289, 670 ad displaying samples. Each sample covers
information of both the ad and corresponding mobile user,
e.g., an ad id, click or non-click reaction, position, device id,
device ip, and internet access type.
A. Application 1: Noisy Linear Query
We first introduce the details of our setup for trading noisy
linear queries, where a static market framework using marked
prices has been investigated in [8]. On one hand, we regard the
MovieLens users, who contributed the ratings, as the data own-
ers in data markets. Additionally, for the data owners, we adopt
the differential privacy based privacy leakage quantification
mechanism and the tanh based privacy compensation functions
from [8]. On the other hand, we simulate the noisy linear
queries from online data consumers. To validate the adaptivity
of our pricing mechanism, the parameters of each linear
query are randomly drawn from either a multivariate normal
distribution with zero mean vector and identity covariance
matrix or a uniform distribution within the interval [−1, 1],
while the variance of Laplace noise added to the true answer
is randomly selected from {10k|k ∈ Z, |k| ≤ 4}. Under each
query Qt, we compute the privacy compensations of all data
owners, and then generate an n-dimensional feature vector
with the method in Section II-B. We recall that we evenly
divide the sorted privacy compensations into n partitions, sum
those falling into a certain partition, and thus obtain a feature.
For the sake of normalization, we scale each feature vector
such that its L2 norm is 1, i.e., ∀t ∈ [T ], ‖xt‖ = 1 and
S = 1. Besides, we set the reserve price of a query to be
the total privacy compensation, i.e., qt =
∑
i∈[n] xt,i here.
In nature, the L2 norm of the weight vector for deriving qt is√
n. Moreover, we draw the weight vector θ∗ for modeling the
market values of queries in a similar way to sample the query
parameters. The difference is that we further scale θ∗ such that
its L2 norm is
√
2n, i.e., ‖θ∗‖ = √2n. This guarantees that
the market value of each query vt = xtT θ∗ is no less than its
reserve price qt with a high probability. Furthermore, we set
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Fig. 4. Cumulative regrets with varying dimensions of feature vector in pricing of noisy linear query.
TABLE I
STATISTICS OVER PRICING OF NOISY LINEAR QUERY PER POUND UNDER
THE VERSION WITH RESERVE PRICE.
n T Market Value Reserve Price Posted Price Regret
1 102 1.414 1 1.409 (0.045) 0.035 (0.202)
20 104 ∗3.874 (1.278) 3.388 (0.776) 3.685 (1.631) 0.166 (0.824)
40 104 5.246 (1.616) 4.739 (1.188) 5.254 (1.614) 0.743 (1.933)
60 105 7.098 (1.910) 5.733 (1.491) 7.089 (1.912) 0.220 (1.257)
80 105 7.266 (2.046) 6.531 (1.761) 7.243 (2.091) 0.387 (1.690)
100 105 8.824 (2.235) 7.221 (1.985) 8.820 (2.242) 0.686 (2.461)
∗The entry is stored in the format: mean (standard deviation).
the data broker’s initial knowledge set E1 of θ∗ such that its
L2 norm is no more than 2
√
n, i.e., R = 2
√
n.
In Fig. 4, we plot the cumulative regrets of four different
versions of our pricing mechanism under the linear model,
including Algorithm 1* (the pure version), Algorithm 2*
(the version with uncertainty), Algorithm 1 (the version with
reserve price), and Algorithm 2 (the version with reserve price
and uncertainty). Here, the dimension of feature vector n first
takes the value 1, and then increases from 20 to 100 with a
step of 20. Besides, δ is fixed at 0.01, which is in the pre-
analyzed order of O(n/T ) for n = 1, but is much larger than
O(n/T ) for n 6= 1. Moreover, in each round t, the randomness
δt in the market value vt is drawn from the normal distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation σ = δ/(
√
2 log 2 log T ).
Furthermore, the threshold  is set to log2(T )/T for n = 1
as claimed in Theorem 3, while is set to n2/T for n 6= 1
in Theorem 1. As a complement to Fig. 4, we list some
precise statistic information about the version with reserve
price in Table I, including the dimension of feature vector
n, the number of total rounds T , together with the means
and standard deviations of market value, reserve price, posted
price, and regret per round. We note that the market value
column can work as a baseline for relatively measuring the
levels of uncertainty (in the magnitude of 0.1% of the market
value) and regret.
We first observe Fig. 4 holistically. We can see that under a
specific version, the cumulative regret at the end of a certain
number of rounds t increases with n. The reason is that when n
grows, the data broker needs to post exploratory prices in more
rounds to obtain a good knowledge of the weight vector θ∗,
and thus can accumulate more regret. This outcome conforms
to our theoretic regret analysis in Section III-C2.
We now observe the one-dimensional case in Fig. 4(a) and
the multi-dimensional cases from Fig. 4(b) to Fig. 4(f) more
carefully. We start with the one-dimensional case. First, by
comparing the purple and blue solid lines in Fig. 4(a), we can
see that the introduction of the reserve price constraint has no
effect on the pure version of our pricing mechanism. When
n = 1, the reserve price and the market value of each query are
constants 1 and
√
2, respectively. In addition, the data broker’s
initial knowledge of the market value is the interval [0, 2].
Thus, in the first round, no matter the data broker considers
or ignores the reserve price 1, she posts the exploratory price
1, which is less than the market value
√
2, and should be
accepted by the data consumer. After this round, the interval
is refined to [1, 2], which indicates that the reserve price 1 can
no longer affect the posted prices. Second, by comparing the
(a) Noisy Linear Query (n = 100) (b) Accommodation Rental (c) Impression
Fig. 5. Regret ratios in pricings of noisy linear query, accommodation rental, and impression.
purple (resp., blue) solid line with the green (resp., golden)
dashed line in Fig. 4(a), we can also see that the introduction
of low uncertainty will slightly increase the cumulative regret
in the pure version (resp., the version with reserve price).
We next focus on the multi-dimensional cases. Once again,
we examine how the reserve price constraint can affect our
posted price mechanism. We can find that the incorporation of
reserve price can dramatically reduce the cumulative regret. In
particular, when n = 20 and the number of rounds t is 104,
the version with reserve price (resp., the version with reserve
price and uncertainty) reduces 13.16% (resp., 10.92%) of the
cumulative regret than the pure version (resp., the version with
uncertainty). We further examine the impact of uncertainty. We
can see that the existence of uncertainty accumulates more
regret, especially when t is large. In particular, when n = 60
and t = 105, the version with uncertainty (resp., the version
with reserve price and uncertainty) increases 25.25% (resp.,
24.86%) of the cumulative regret than the pure version (resp.,
the version with reserve price). This is because in the case
of a large t, the data broker already has a good knowledge
of the weight vector θ∗, and posts the conservative price
with a high probability. Besides, we recall that to circumvent
uncertainty, the conservative price, involving the minimum
possible market value
¯
pt, decreases by a “buffer” of size δ
to keep its acceptance ratio (Algorithm 2, Line 27), which
can generate a higher regret.
We finally provide an intuitive sense of the regret level of
our pricing mechanism. We introduce a metric, called regret
ratio, which is defined as the ratio between the cumulative re-
gret and the cumulative market value, i.e.,
∑t
k=1Rk/
∑t
k=1 vk
at the end of t rounds. For example, in Table I, we can divide
the mean values in the regret column by those in the market
value column, and get the regret ratios of the version with
reserve price for different n’s at the end of T rounds .
Coupled with Fig. 4(f), which depicts the cumulative regrets
of four different versions for n = 100 at the end of different
numbers of rounds, Fig. 5(a) further plots the regret ratios.
One key observation from Fig. 5(a) is that when the number
of rounds t is small, i.e., when t ≤ 100, the regret ratio of the
version with reserve price (resp., the version with reserve price
and uncertainty) is much lower than that of the pure version
(resp., the version with uncertainty). This reflects a critical
functionality of reserve price: it can mitigate the cold-start
problem in a posted price mechanism. More specifically, in
the beginning, the data broker holds a broad knowledge set of
the weight vector θ∗, and thus the market value estimation of
a query is coarse, which implies a high regret ratio. However,
with the help of reserve price, the data broker can improve
the market value estimation, through imposing an additional
lower bound and refining the knowledge set more quickly.
The mitigation of cold start can be a factor underlying our
above observation that the reserve price constraint reduces the
cumulative regret.
The second key observation from Fig. 5(a) is that as the
number of rounds t grows, the difference between the regret
ratios of the versions with and without reserve price becomes
smaller. Besides, when t is very large, the regret ratios of all
four versions are very low. In particular, at the end of T = 105
rounds, the regret ratios of the pure version, the version with
uncertainty, the version with reserve price, and the version with
reserve price and uncertainty are 8.48%, 11.19%, 7.77%, and
9.87%, respectively. The reason is that after enough rounds,
the data broker will have a good estimation of a query’s
market value, and the effect of reserve price on the posted
price diminishes. An extreme example happens in the one-
dimensional case presented above, where after the first round,
the reserve price has already been excluded from the estimated
interval. At last, we provide a risk-averse baseline for the
versions involving the reserve price, which consistently posts
the reserve price in each round. The regret ratio of such a
baseline is 18.16%. Therefore, compared with this baseline,
the data broker, using our pricing mechanism, can further
reduce 57.19% and 45.64% of the regret ratios in the version
with reserve price and the version with reserve price and
uncertainty, respectively.
These evaluation results demonstrate that our pricing mech-
anism under the fundamental linear model can indeed reduce
the practical regret of the data broker in online data markets.
B. Application 2: Accommodation Rental
We first describe how to preprocess the Airbnb dataset, and
also present some setup details for pricing accommodation
rentals under the log-linear model. First, to obtain the feature
vector of each booking record, we mainly utilize a data
analysis library in Python, called pandas. In particular, we
process the categorical features with the pandas built-in data
type “categoricals”, which can handle the missing values, and
return an integer array of codes for all categories. Besides,
we add some interaction features to enhance model capacity.
The final dimension of each feature vector n is 55. Second, to
obtain the weight vector θ∗ in modeling the market values of
accommodations, we regard the logarithmic lodging prices as
target variables in supervised learning, and then apply linear
regression to learn the coefficients of different features, which
play the role of θ∗ here. Specifically, the mean squared error
(MSE) over the test set, which occupying 20% of the Airbnb
dataset, is 0.226. Third, to investigate how different settings
of reserve price can affect the posted price mechanism, we
vary the ratio between the natural logarithms of reserve price
and market value, namely qt/vt. Fourth, when computing the
regret ratios, we use the real rather than the logarithmic posted
price and market value, by applying the natural exponential
function to pt and vt.
Fig. 5(b) depicts the regret ratios of the pure version of
our pricing mechanism under the log-linear model, as well
as the versions with reserve price, where qt/vt ranges from
0.4, to 0.6, and to 0.8. From Fig. 5(b), we can see that when
the reserve price is set to be closer to the market value, the
regret ratio decreases, especially when the number of rounds
t is small, i.e., when t ≤ 103. In other words, as the reserve
price is approaching the market value, its impact on mitigating
the cold-start problem in a posted price mechanism is more
evident. We can also see from Fig. 5(b) that at the end of T =
74, 111 rounds, the regret ratios are very low. In particular,
the regret ratios of the pure version, and the versions with
reserve price where qt/vt = 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, are 4.57%,
4.01%, 3.83%, and 3.79%, respectively. We here still consider
the risk-averse baseline, where the reserve price is posted in
each round, for comparison. The regret ratios of this baseline
are 23.40%, 17.00%, and 9.33% in the versions with reserve
price where qt/vt = 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, respectively. Compared
with this baseline, the data broker can further reduce 82.88%,
77.46%, and 59.39% of the regret ratios, respectively.
The above fine-grained evaluation results provide a deeper
understanding of the reserve price’s role in reducing the
practical regret of a posted price mechanism. Besides, our
proposed pricing mechanism significantly outperforms the
baseline which merely exploits the reserve price.
C. Application 3: Impression in Advertising
We first introduce data preprocessing and setup for pricing
impressions under the logistic model. First, to handle the
categorical data fields in ad displaying samples, we utilize
one-hot encoding with the hashing trick, where the dimension
of the feature vector n serves as the modulus after hashing.
Second, we regard the click/non-click states as target variables,
further apply Follow The Proximally Regularized Leader
(FTRL-Proximal) based logistic regression algorithm (which
has been deployed at Google’s advertising platform [44]),
and thus obtain the weight vector θ∗ for capturing CTRs. In
particular, FTRL-Proximal is an online learning algorithm with
per-coordinate learning rates and L1, L2 regularizations, and
can preserve excellent performance and sparsity. When testing
over the samples in the last two days, the logistic loss is 0.420
(resp., 0.406) at n = 128 (resp., n = 1024). Besides, the learnt
weight vector θ∗ is quite sparse. Specifically, the number of
nonzero elements in θ∗ is 21 (resp., 23) at n = 128 (resp.,
n = 1024). In what follows, we investigate two different cases
to validate the feasibility of our pricing mechanism over both
sparse and dense feature vectors. One is the sparse case, which
keeps all the elements in each feature vector no matter their
weights are nonzero or zero. The other is the dense case, which
omits those features if their weights are zero.
In Fig. 5(c), we plot the regret ratios of the pure version of
our pricing mechanism in both sparse and dense cases, when n
takes the values 128 and 1024. We can observe from Fig. 5(c)
that the regret ratio in the sparse case decreases more slowly
than that in the dense case, especially when the number of
rounds t is smaller than 103. This outcome stems from that
the starting rounds are mainly dedicated to eliminating those
zero elements in the weight vector, which implies a larger
regret ratio in the beginning. This reason can also account
for the phenomenon that in the sparse case, the regret ratio
for n = 1024 decreases more slowly than that for n = 128.
Even so, after 105 rounds, the regret ratios are 2.02%, 0.41%,
8.04%, and 0.89%, when n takes the values 128 and 1024 in
the spare and dense cases, respectively. Furthermore, when the
number of rounds t becomes larger, the regret ratios can be
sustainably reduced.
These evaluation results reveal that our proposed pricing
mechanism performs well over both sparse and dense feature
vectors. By further combining with the pricing of accommo-
dation rental, we can conclude that our pricing mechanism has
a good extensibility to non-linear market value models.
D. Details on Implementation and Overhead
We implemented our pricing mechanism in Python 2.7.15.
The running environment is a Broadwell-E workstation with
64-bit Ubuntu 16.04.5 Linux operation system. In particular,
the processor is Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6900K with 8 cores,
the base frequency is 3.20GHz, the memory size is 64GB,
and the cache size is 20MB. We use the function time.time()
in Python to record the elapsed time, and use the command
cat /proc/PID/status | grep ’VmRSS’ to monitor memory
overhead, where PID is the process identifier of our program.
Our source code is online available from [51].
We next present the computation and memory overheads of
the above three applications. For the pricing of noisy linear
query under the version with reserve price, when n = 100,
the online latency of the data broker in determining the posted
price and updating her knowledge set is 0.115ms per query.
Besides, the memory overhead is 151MB. For the pricing of
accommodation rental under the version with reserve price
(qt/vt = 0.6), the online latency is 0.019ms per booking
request, and the memory overhead is 105MB. For the pricing
of impression, when n = 1024, the online latency is 3.509ms
(resp., 0.024ms) per ad displaying sample in the sparse (resp.,
dense) case. Additionally, the memory overhead is 106MB
(resp., 75MB) in the sparse (resp., dense) case.
In a nutshell, our proposed pricing mechanism has a light
load under both linear and non-linear models, and can be
employed to dynamically price those products with customiza-
tion, existence of reserve price, and timeliness properties.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review related work.
A. Data Market Design
An explosive demand for sharing data contributes to grow-
ing attention on data market design [6], [52]. The researchers
from the database community [10]–[16] mainly focused
on arbitrage freeness in pricing queries over the relational
databases, which maintain insensitive data. Here, the existence
of arbitrage means that the data consumer can buy a query
with a lower price than the marked price, through combining
a bundle of other cheaper queries. Thus, the data broker needs
to rule out arbitrage opportunities to preserve her revenue. Spe-
cific to personal data trading, the researchers routinely adopted
the cost-plus pricing strategy, where the data broker first
compensates each data owner for her privacy leakage, and then
scales up the total privacy compensation to determine the price
of query for the data consumer. In particular, the quantification
of privacy leakage primarily resorts to the classical differential
privacy framework [53], [54] or its variants, e.g., Pufferfish
privacy [55]–[57]. Besides, different researchers investigated
distinct types of queries from the data consumers. Ghosh
and Roth [9] considered single counting query. The follow-
up work by Li et al. [8] further extended to multiple noisy
linear queries. Hynes et al. [58] investigated model training
requests. We took the ubiquitous data correlations into ac-
count, including the correlations among data owners [17] and
the temporal correlations within a certain data owner’s time-
series data [18]. We thus proposed to trade noisy aggregate
statistics over private correlated data.
The original intention of these works is to ensure the
consistency and robustness of a non-interactive pricing strategy
against cunning data consumers. However, they didn’t consider
the responses from the data consumers, and further optimize
the cumulative revenue of the data broker, which is instead
the major focus of this work.
B. Contextual Dynamic Pricing
The dynamic pricing problem has been extensively studied
in diverse contexts. The pioneering work by Kleinberg and
Leighton [59] considered markets for identical products, and
designed optimal posted pricing strategies under the buyers’
identical, random, and worst-case valuation models. However,
the products in practical markets, e.g., online commerce and
advertising, tend to differ from each other. This further mo-
tivated the emergence of contextual pricing, where the seller
intends to sell a sequence of highly differentiated products,
posts a price for each product, and then observes whether
the buyer accepts or not. More specifically, each product is
represented by a feature vector for differentiation, while its
market value is typically assumed to linear in the feature vec-
tor. The researchers thus turned to online learning the weight
vector from feedbacks, and further converted this task to a
multi-dimensional binary search problem. Amin et al. [45] first
proposed a stochastic gradient descent (SGD) based solution,
which can attain O(T 2/3) strategic regret by ignoring logarith-
mic terms. However, their solution requires the feature vectors
to be drawn from an i.i.d. distribution, such that each feature
vector can serve as an unbiased estimate of the weight vector.
The follow-up work by Cohen et al. [21] abandoned this strict
requirement. Besides, they approximated the polytope-shaped
knowledge set with ellipsoid, and provided a worst-case regret
of O(n2 log T ), which is essentially the pure version of our
pricing mechanism. Lobel et al. [22] further reduced regret
to O(n log T ) by projecting and cylindrifying the polytope.
Most recently, Leme et al. [23] borrowed a key concept from
geometric probability, called the intrinsic volumes of a convex
body, and achieved a regret guarantee of O(n4 log log(nT )).
The key principle behind this line of works is to identify the
centroid of the knowledge set or its projection/transformation,
such that each exploratory posted price can roughly impose a
central cut in terms of different measures, e.g., volume, surface
area, and width. Besides, although the most recent two works
optimized the regret, they are too computationally complex to
be deployed in practical online markets.
Yet, it is worth noting that the contextual dynamic pricing
mechanisms significantly differ from the classical cutting-
plane or localization algorithms in the field of convex opti-
mization [60], e.g., the original ellipsoid method [33] and the
analytic center cutting-plane method [61]. In particular, the
purpose of a cutting-plane method is to find a point in a convex
set for optimizing a preset objective function. In contrast,
the goal of a contextual dynamic pricing mechanism is to
minimize the cumulative regret during the process of locating
a preset point, i.e., the weight vector here. Furthermore,
under contextual dynamic pricing, the direction of each cut
is fixed by the feature vector of a product requested by a
buyer, while the seller can only choose the position of the
cut through posting a certain price. This setting distinguishes
contextual dynamic pricing from a majority of ellipsoid based
designs [62]–[64], which allow the seller to control the di-
rection of each cut. In fact, the contextual dynamic pricing
problem can also be modeled into a contextual multi-armed
bandit (MAB), where the arms/actions to be exploited and
explored are the domain of the weight vector. However,
given the domain of weight vector is continuous, we need to
apply the discretization technique, which makes the number
of bandits extremely large. In addition to inefficiency, since
the payoff/regret function is piecewise and highly asymmetric,
this sort of solutions can be oracle-based, e.g., [65]–[70], and
inevitably incurs polynomial rather than logarithmic regret in
the number of total rounds T [22].
Unfortunately, none of above works has incorporated the
reserve price constraint, and further examined its impact on a
posted price mechanism. In particular, due to the existence of
reserve price, the cut over the knowledge set should support an
arbitrary position, which instead was not touched in existing
works. Besides, the impacts of reserve price on mitigating the
cold-start problem and thus reducing the cumulative regret are
first analyzed and verified in this work.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed the first contextual dynamic
pricing mechanism with the reserve price constraint, for the
data broker to maximize her revenue in online personal data
markets. Our posted price mechanism features the properties
of ellipsoid to perform online optimization effectively and effi-
ciently, and can support both linear and nonlinear market value
models, while allowing some uncertainty. We further have
extended it to several other similar application scenarios, and
extensively evaluated over three practical datasets. Empirical
results have demonstrated the feasibility and generality of our
pricing mechanism, as well as the functionality of the reserve
price constraint.
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Fig. 6. An adversarial example in the two-dimensional case, if the conserva-
tive posted prices are allowed to cut the ellipsoid.
APPENDIX
Theorem 3. The worst-case regret of the pure version of our
pricing mechanism in the one-dimensional case is O(log T ).
Proof. As illustrated in Section II-C, ellipsoid degenerates
to interval in the one-dimensional case. Specifically, we let
xt ∈ [−S, S] and K1 = {θ ∈ R|θ ∈ [−R,R]}. Thus,
we have: ∀t ∈ [T ], p¯t −
¯
pt ≤ 2RS. Besides, in round t,
if p¯t −
¯
pt > , the data broker will take the exploratory
price to refine her knowledge set of θ∗ by half. Hence, we
have: Te ≤ log2(2RS/). Moreover, in round t, the regret
incurred by posting the exploratory (resp., conservative) price
is bounded above by p¯t (resp., p¯t −
¯
pt), and can be further
bounded above by RS (resp., the threshold ). Therefore, the
total regret is no more than TeRS + (T − Te). When Te
takes its upper bound log2(2RS/) and  takes log2(T )/T , the
cumulative regret is O(log T ). This completes the proof.
Lemma 8. If the data broker are allowed to utilize the
conservative posted prices to refine the knowledge set, her
cumulative worst-case regret is O(T ).
Proof. We set R = 1 and S = 1 for clarity, i.e., A1 = In×n
and ∀t ∈ [T ], ‖xt‖ = 1. We consider an adversary, who
chooses a sequence of T queries, where the feature vectors
in the first half are ∀t ∈ [bT/2c],xt = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)T , and
the feature vectors in the second half are ∀t ∈ {bT/2c +
1, . . . , T},xt = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)T . Besides, in the first half of
rounds, the adversary sets the reserve prices to be the middle
prices, i.e., ∀t ∈ [bT/2c], qt = ¯pt+p¯t2 , while discarding the
reserve price constraint in the second half. Under the above
adversary setting, suppose the data broker is allowed to utilize
the conservative prices to refine her knowledge set. During
the first bT/2c rounds, she will successively impose central
cuts over the ellipsoid along the first coordinate. Besides,
the width of the ellipsoid’s first axis shrinks exponentially,
while all the lengthes of the other n − 1 axes expand ex-
ponentially, in particular with the ratio n√
n2−1 . Thus, at the
end of bT/2c rounds, the width of the ellipsoid along the
second coordinate is 2( n√
n2−1 )
bT/2c. We now compute the
cumulative regret in the second half. Given p¯t−
¯
pt represents
the width of the ellipsoid along xt = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)T , the
data broker will successively post the exploratory prices, i.e.,
the middle prices, to cut along the second coordinate, until
the width is below the threshold . Besides, each cut can
at most shorten the width by half. Hence, the number of
rounds where the exploratory prices are posted is at least
min(T −bT/2c, log2(2( n√n2−1 )bT/2c/)) = O(T ). Therefore,
the cumulative worst-case regret in the above adversary case
is O(T ), which completes the proof. In Fig. 6, we give
an intuitive view of this adversarial example in the two-
dimensional case.
